Stone, David, First Reich: Inside the German Army 1870-1871 Brassey's, 2002,

It used to be the case that in certain armies the publication of military historical studies was considered a de rigueur intellectual token for ambitious officers. The simple fact of such literary production presumably outweighed the intrinsic value of the work itself. The author of this work, FIRST REICH (Brassey’s, London, 2002, ISBN 1 85753 341 0) David Stone, served for thirty years in the Duke of Edingburgh's Royal Regiment prior to retiring in 2002 with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. This reader cannot help wondering whether “First Reich”--apparently the outgrowth of a lecture originally delivered to assorted NATO brass hats at SHAEF headquarters in Belgium, falls into this category.

What rapidly becomes clear after paging through this book is the disappointing realization that it is little more than a lightly annotated compendium—highly partial at that—of accounts of the Franco-Prussian War. Stone forthrightly declares his heavy reliance on Archibald Forbes' My Experiences of the War Between France and Germany 1870-1871 (London, 1871) and Sigel and von Specht’s Germany’s Army and Navy in the 19th Century, (Chicago, 1900). Readers will find nothing new or interesting here. Heavy and uncritical use of secondary sources, along with a fairly blatant pro-German bias (which, unsurprisingly, is also unoriginal; most of the English-language chroniclers in the immediate aftermath of the war betrayed varying degrees of francophobia, and their recent epigones, either unaware, careless, or simply lacking in enough energy to develop and muster their own subjectivities, have trodden the same thematic path). There was perhaps reason enough for English patriots writing during those heady years of anglo-french rivalry to exhibit a good pinch of Schadenfreude (either overt or implicit) at the French comeuppance, but it is rather troubling to see that these ‘fossilized’ views continue to be inflicted upon a reading public that may not always be wary enough to examine these latent and one-sided explications with the circumspection necessary.

Thick, well-bound and profusely, if fancifully illustrated patriotic tomes like Siegel’s and von Specht’s (which form much of the basis for Stone’s work) were standard fare at the turn of the century, doubtlessly to be found under the Christmas tree for the edification of the next generation of warriors; but these grandiose and sanitized ‘histories’ were comemorative and exemplary rather than critical, serious histories. Evidently they were effective: the generation of 1914, on either side of the Rhine, imbued with the spirit and the simplifications of such exhortative works, rushed to slaughter with splendid abandon. To rely on such material is treading on uncertain ground indeed. And the distance of a hundred years or more notwithstanding, the tendentious content has worked its subtle effect on David Stone. According to Stone, France was “…an ill-led, politically ailing and somewhat naïve…” while Prussia was “…politically aware, thoroughly pragmatic and militarily modern…” (p. 9), and “…fundamental cultural and national differences between the emotional, very political French and the more pragmatic Germans” (p. 200). Although Stone spent some time in Europe, he cannot have profited very much from his stay if he deals in such stereotypes; as a German who has spent the greater part of his life in Frankreich, I hope I will be allowed to say that there is even today, in the year 2005, quite as much, if not more, difference in ‘national' character between a Hessian and Saxon than between a German and a Frenchman.

Such caricaturical thinking patterns were par for the course during the 19th century, and very likely, the idea of a racially innate warrior and military superiority among the Germans may have resonated among some English writers of the day who thus vicariously shared in the martial glory of their teutonic cousins. In the heyday of Gobineau, Morton, and Kipling, such simplifications and generalizations might have been excused, but it is curious to find them cropping up still.

Another pet peeve of this reviewer is historians who glibly and without support magically transport us into the confines of people’s thinking and judgments, thus, as David Stone would have it, “…the German victory at Wissembourg had made such an impact on Napoleon and the French high command that any sort of significant offensive action by their forces was in reality very far from their minds…” (p.67), or Marshal Bazaine at the closing stages of the battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour “really had no doubt…”and, similarly, “All this was undoubtedly still at the forefront of the mind of Prince William…” How marvelous to be possessed of such certainty and knowledge into the ideas and counsels of personages dead for more than century! Especially remarkable is the faculty of penetrating the souls of such notoriously elusive, opaque people as Napoleon III, or Marshal Bazaine, a man so execrated in his own time, that to pierce the now petrified layers of vilification around him and arrive even at a supposition seems…impossible.

Finally, if cited works and bibliography can offer any indication, it is unclear what, if any, command of German Lieutenant-Colonel Stone has, as most of the German sources he cites are of English translations. The use of an Osprey publication as a major source is yet another proof—if any further were wanting—of ‘First Reich’s’ fundamental lack of substance.